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Abstract
We use Belgian rm level data over the period 1996-2007 to analyze the impact of imports
from China and other low wage countries on rm growth, exit, and skill upgrading. We
distinguish the impact of imports into two dierent channels: industry-level import competition
and rm-level outsourcing. We nd that imports from China are much more important than
imports from other low-wage countries. Industry-level import competition from China reduced
rm employment and induced skill upgrading. Import competition from China alone can
explain around 30 percent of the total skill upgrading in Belgian manufacturing during 1996-
2007. Our IV results conrm the ambiguous role of outsourcing in rm employment growth, but
we also nd that outsourcing to China will increase the relative employment of non-production
workers and is benecial for rm survival.
Keywords: import competition; outsourcing; China; skill upgrading.
JEL Classication: F11, F14, F16
Corresponding author. Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics; National
Bank of Belgium; CEP; and CEPR. Address: Houghton St, WC2A 2AE, London, UK. Fax: +44 20 7955 7412.
E-mail: G.Mion@lse.ac.uk
yUniversit e Catholique de Louvain; LICOS. E-mail: hylke.vandenbussche@uclouvain.be.
zCatholic University of Leuven; LICOS. E-mail: linke.zhu@econ.kuleuven.be.
11 Introduction
This paper investigates the eects of industry-level import competition and rm-level outsourcing
with China and other low-wage countries on rm performances using rm-level data from Belgian
manufacturing during the period 1996-2007. While we also study the eect of trade on employment
growth and rm exit, the main contribution of our paper is to provide evidence on the eect of
trade on within-rm skill upgrading. To the best of our knowledge, we also the rst to provide
IV estimates of the causal eect of rm-level outsourcing.
Since late 1980s, there has been a rising concern about the deteriorating situations of the
low-skilled workers in the developed countries. Both job opportunities and wages for low-skilled
workers are decreasing relative to high-skilled workers. Two explanations most often mentioned
are: skill-biased technological change (or SBTC) and increased trade with developing countries. In
the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant view among labor economists (and also some trade economists)
was that technology was more important than trade as a driving force behind changes in the
structure of employment.
However, some recent developments in trade theory, outlined in Section 2, have re-shifted
the attention to the role of trade. Besides theory some recent phenomena, like the recent rapid
growth of countries like India and China, have also contributed to the revival of the trade-based
explanation. Compared to the main western countries' trade partners in the 80's, developing
countries like India and China are endowed with a much bigger stock of low-skilled labor force at
very competitive wages. The dramatically growing trade volumes with such countries may have
thus aected low-skilled workers in the developed countries more than ever.
While studies about trade and skill upgrading are already abundant in the literature (see, for
example, Feenstra and Hanson [1999] for the US, Hijzen et al. [2005] for the UK, Falk and Koebel
[2002] for Germany, etc.), we innovate with respect to previous contributions in several ways.
First, we use both industry-level and rm-level trade data, as well as data on rm-level employ-
ment structure, to identify the impact of trade on skill upgrading. Indeed, due to data limitation,
most of the research in the literature have been carried out at industry-level (with a few exceptions
such as Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007). By contrast, labor economists have provided a sizeable
amount of rm-level evidence relating technological change and within rm skill upgrading1 The
failure to use rm-level data leads to at least two drawbacks. One, industry-level studies do not
allow to distinguish whether skill upgrading is taking place within rms or between rms. Two,
1See, for example, Levy and Murnane (1996), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt (2002).
2it is possible to split trade into import competing goods and outsourcing only by looking at the
level of the rm. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007), which is arguably the closest related paper to
ours, provide a descriptive view of the impact of outsourcing on French manufacturing while our
purpose here is to identify the causal relationship of outsourcing (as well as import competition)
on skill upgrading by using the IV method.2
Second, we distinguish China from other low wage counties. While the distinction between
imports from low-wage and non-low-wage countries is made by a few other papers in the skill
upgrading literature, the distinction between imports from China and other low-wage countries
is made, in the context of trade-induced technological change, only in Bloom et al. (2008).
However, as Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) show, Chinese exports have dierent characteristics
with respect other other low-wage countries. Chinese exports are in fact more sophisticated and
show more overlap with the products of developed countries. Indeed, our results suggest that
treating China as a dierent animal is important.
Third, while most of the previous studies have used data up to the late 1990s, we use much
more recent data from 1996 to 2007. This is important since trade with low-wage countries,
and especially with China, has dramatically increased during the past decade. Fourth we use
workers' education as a measure of skills, which is much more accurate than the crude distinction
between production and nonproduction workers used in the literature (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996;
Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). However, in order to compare with previous research, we also
report ndings for production and non-production workers.
Following is a preview of our main ndings. First, our results conrm that trade with low-
wage countries is important in explaining skill upgrading. According to our IV estimations,
imports from China alone can explain around 30 percent of the total skill upgrading in Belgian
manufacturing during the period 1996-2007. Second, imports from China is much more important
than imports from other low-wage countries, both in explaining skill upgrading and in explaining
rm employment growth. Third, rm-level outsourcing to China will also induce skill upgrading
and is benecial for rm survival.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the theoretical
background of our research. Section 3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 describes
2There exist some rm-level studies relating skill upgrading within multi-national rms, such as Head and Ries
(2002) for Japanese multinationals, Hansson (2005) for Swedish multinationals, and Castellani et al. (2008) for
Italian multinationals. However, such contributions focus on a special group of rms (multinationals) only and it
is thus questionable how to extend results to a larger spectrum of rms. Our paper also relates to some rm-level
analysis about developing countries and trade, such as Bustos (2005) for Argentina and Eric Verhoogen (2008) for
Mexico.
3the econometric models and discusses main results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points out
directions for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Trade and Skill Upgrading
As already mentioned, the favorite explanation for the increase in relative demand of skilled
workers in developed countries is the 'skill-biased technological change' (SBTC). The main reasons
that led economists to favor the SBTC explanation are as follows. First, skill upgrading was found
to happen mainly within industries rather than between industries, which contrasts the prediction
of traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). Second, skill
upgrading not only occurred in developed countries but also in developing countries, which is
again against the prediction of HO theory. Third, product-price studies found that the prices of
labor intensive goods did not decrease signicantly relative to skill intensive goods in developed
countries. This violates the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Lawrence and Slaughter,
1993, Leamer, 1996, and Baldwin and Cain, 2000). Finally, factor content calculation revealed that
trade with developing countries was not important enough to have a major impact on employment
structure in developed countries (see, e.g., Krugman, 1995).
However, some recent developments in trade theory have made these critiques questionable.
First, trade liberalization may have altered the returns of dierent available technologies and lead
to a skill-biased technological change that has ultimately pushed to a skill upgrading (Wood,
1998, Acemoglu, 2003, Ekholm and Midelfart, 2005, Bloom et al., 2008 ). This hypothesis makes
the trade-based explanation consistent with the technology-based explanation. Second, trade
economists have recently extended the traditional HO model and shifted the focus away from trade
in goods to trade in tasks, or oshoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, Feenstra and Hanson, 2001,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). This shift in focus makes trade-induced within industry
skill upgrading possible. Trade in tasks also allows to explain why both developed and developing
countries can experience skill upgrading after trade liberalization with the reason being that tasks
that are newly oshored to developing countries tend to be more skill intensive than those already
performed in developing countries. Moreover, since the production of skill intensive goods can
also benet from trade by outsourcing its most labor intensive stages to developing countries,
prices can fall and this make it dicult to argue about any clear pattern in the prices of labor
and skill intensive goods. Finally, oshoring (or production fragmentation), as Krugman (2008)
4pointed out, will also lead the traditional factor content calculation, which led Krugman (1995)
to conclude that trade with developing countries was not important, to underestimate the eect
of trade on the change of employment structure.
In short, there are reasons to believe that trade is important to explaining employment struc-
ture changes in the developed countries. However, we still have to spend few words about the
mechanisms through which trade may induce within rm skill upgrading, since most of the above
mentioned debate has an industry-level focus.
At rst glance, although we have reasons to believe that trade with low-wage countries will
increase the relative demand for skilled workers in developed countries, it does not necessarily mean
that we should observe within rm skill upgrading. If rms are heterogeneous and face diculties
in changing their technology and/or their production process then the bulk of skill upgrading
within an industry might happen across rms. However, there are at least three possibilities to
rationalize within rm skill upgrading. First, trade may induce within rm technology upgrading,
which may increase rm's relative employment of skilled workers. Second, multi-product rms
may specialize in more skill intensive products when facing competition from low-wage imports,
which will also induce within rm skill upgrading. Finally, rms have also the option to outsource
the labor intensive stages of the production process to low-wage countries.
2.2 China is Dierent
There are at least two reasons to consider that with China separately in the analysis. First,
Chinese exports are large in volume and increasing very quickly and China has a massive amount
of un-skilled labor force which is paid a very competitive wage. All these aspects are worth to
be considered. Second, the idea of including Chinese exports separately has a deeper founda-
tion. Schott (2008) shows that China's export similarity with OECD countries, as measured by
traded product's overlap, is higher than that of other non-OECD countries. Furthermore, China's
similarity with OECD countries is growing faster that with respect to any other country. These
ndings highlight the fact that rms in developed countries may `feel' more competitive pressure
from Chinese exports than from other low-wage countries' exports.
On the other hand, some researches suggest that export data may overestimate the competi-
tiveness of China in the international market. Van Assche et al. (2008a, 2008b) argue that more
than a half of Chinese exports is processing trade of goods for which most of the value added
comes from imports (especially imports from other east Asian countries).
5Given the ambiguity about the competitiveness of Chinese exports, it will be interesting to nd
out in our data whether Chinese exports have a dierent eects on rms in developed countries
compared to exports of other low-wage countries. While a lot of studies have been carried out to
explain why Chinese exports are special (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006, Rodrik, 2006, and Xu and
Lu, 2009), very little is known about whether the eects of Chinese exports in developed countries
are also `special'.
3 Data
3.1 Industry-level Trade and Production Data
The industry-level imports data comes from the ComExt Intra- and Extra-European Trade Data,
which is a harmonized and comparable statistical database for EU countries merchandize trade.
The database is compiled by Eurostat, using statistics from the member states. We extract data
on Belgian manufacturing imports by country of origin and by 4-digit NACE rev.1 industry for
the period of 1995-2007. Then we categorize countries into four groups: OECD countries, China,
other low-wage countries (BJS), and the rest of the world. The denition for low-wage country
is from Table 1 in Bernard et al. (2006), where they dene countries with less than 5 percent of
U.S. per capita GDP in 1992 as low-wage countries. According to such denition, major labor-
abundant countries like China, India and Vietnam are all classied as low-wage. Unlike Bernard
et al. (2006), we distinguish China from BJS countries.
We use the variable import share to measure the degree of import competition from dierent
country groups at the four digit NACE code industry level. Let IMPSHAREc
jt denote the import








jt and Mjt represent (respectively) the value of imports from country group c and all coun-
tries. Pjt is domestic production of industry j in year t and comes from the Prodcom Production
Data also provided by Eurostat.
63.2 Firm-level data
Manufacturing rms data come from the Central Balance Sheet Oce at the National Bank of
Belgium (NBB). It collects the annual accounts of all companies registered in Belgium. Most
limited liability enterprizes, plus some other rms, have to le their annual accounts and/or
consolidated group accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Oce every year. Large companies
have to le the full-format balance sheet. Small companies may use the abbreviated format.3
There are some exceptions. Some enterprizes do not have to le any annual accounts.4 For this
study, we selected those companies with their main activity in the manufacturing sector that
led a full-format or abbreviated balance sheet between 1996 and 2007. This provides us with
about 15,000 rms per year for which all the relevant information is available. The data coverage,
compared with other European rm-level data, is particularly good. For example, despite France
has almost 6 times more manufacturing employment than Belgium, the well known French EAE
manufacturing rms database contains data on about `only' 25,000 rms.
Using the information from the balance sheet data, we construct a battery of rms' charac-
teristics. Wage per worker is used as a proxy for skill intensity. Tangible assets per worker is
used as measure for capital intensity. Value added per worker and log employment are used as
measures for labor productivity and rm size, respectively. As standard in the empirical Industrial
Organization literature we also consider rm age. Finally, we use intangible assets per worker to
control for technology-related spending within the rm.
As for dependant variables, employment growth is dened as log dierence of rm's total
employment between year t and year t+1. Firm exit is dened as disappearing from the data set
for two consecutive years. Share of production workers is dened as the ratio of manual workers
to total employment. While most of the papers in the literature only use the share of production
workers to measure skill, we are able to do better thanks to a unique feature of the data. In
particular, we are able to track, for rm with full-format balance sheets, the education level of
workers that enter or exit the workforce of a rm in each year. Using this information, we are
able to construct a proxy for the share of skilled workers (see section 4) based on education. We
dene a skilled worker as a worker having more than secondary school education (ISCED levels 5
3Under the Belgian Company Code, a company is regarded as large if: the annual average of its workforce
exceeds 100 persons or more than one of the following criteria are exceeded: 1) annual average of workforce: 50; 2)
annual turnover (excluding VAT): 7,300,000 euro; 3) balance sheet total: 3,650,000 euro.
4These include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability: general partnerships, or-
dinary limited partnerships, cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members have unlimited
liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships; hospitals, unless they
have taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds, professional associations,
schools and higher education institutions.
7and 6).
Firm-level import data are also provided by the NBB. More precisely, the information comes
from intra-EU (Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade declarations that cover the universe
of trade transactions.5 The two sources of information were merged using the value added tax
number, which identies each rm. Data are extremely rich and comparable in quality to the
widely known French Customs data used in Eaton et al (2004) among others. Imports of each
rm are recorded each year at the 8-digit CN code level by country of origin. In order to measure
outsourcing, following Biscourp and Kramarz (2007), we rst divide rm's imports into two cate-
gories: imports of nished goods and imports of intermediate goods. Finished goods are dened
as CN8 products that correspond to the same 3-digit NACE code of the main activity of the rm.6
Other imports are dened as imports of intermediate goods. Then outsourcing of nished goods







it is imports of nished goods from country group c, Nit is total turnover. Out-
sourcing of intermediate goods from country group c is dened in a similar way.
3.3 Instrumental Variables
In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem of import variables, we use exchange rate and
ad valorem tari data to construct instrumental variables for both industry-level and rm-level
imports. Exchange rate data comes from the IFS database, compiled by the IMF. Ad valorem
tari data is from the online customs tari database, also called the TARIC, provided by European
Commission. Such dataset integrates all tari-like restrictions applying to goods that enter the
EU market by country of origin and CN8 code for several years. Although the database contains
information about many trade restrictive measures (like quotas, weight-based tari, etc.) we only
use ad valorem taris to construct our IVs. The construct a comprehensive trade barrier index
that utilizes information on all trade measures is in fact both cumbersome and highly questionable.
For this reason we decided to focus on ad valorem tari data only.
Using country specic exchange rates data we have constructed country-group/industry spe-
5For intra-EU trade there are relatively small thresholds above which a legal obligation to declare arises. However,
in many cases rms do provide information about their trade even when they are below the threshold. Extra-EU is
virtually exhaustive with the legal requirement for declaration being a value of 1,000 euros or more or a weight of
1,000 kg or more.
6A precise correspondence Table between CN and NACE codes across time have been provided by the NBB.
8cic and country-group/rm specic IVs for industry-level imports and rm-level imports by
using trade ratios as weights. We denote by IV EXCHc
jt the exchange rate IV for import share
of country group c in industry j on year t, and by IV EXCHFINc
it the exchange rate IV for
outsourcing of nished goods from country group c in rm i on year t (rm-level exchange rate




















where h denotes country, E denotes exchange rate, 0 denotes the initial value (i.e., value in 1995)
of the corresponding variable. We use the initial trade ratio rather than current trade ratio,
because current trade ratio may be endogenous. We use turnover rather than total imports as
the denominator in the second equation because otherwise the variable would not be dened for
non-trading rms.
Similarly, denoting IV DUTY c
jt as tari IV for import share of country group c in industry j
on year t, and IV DUTY FINc
it as tari IV for outsourcing of nished goods from country group
c in rm i on year t (IVs for outsourcing of intermediate goods are constructed similarly), we
construct IVs using tari data as follows (where D denotes ad valorem tari, p denotes an 8-digit




















We look at the impact of import competition and outsourcing on four rm adjustment margins:
employment growth, share of blue collar workers, share of skilled (highly educated) workers and
rm exit. The explanatory variables are similar in all equations, i.e., rm-level controls, industry-
level imports and rm-level imports.
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it2 + t + i + "it (1)
Equation 1 is based on Bernard et al. (2006). The dependant variable is the log dierence of
rm i employment between year t and year t+1. Vit is a vector of rm characteristics, including
rm size (log employment), age, labor productivity, capital intensity, skill intensity and intangible
capital intensity (which is used as control for technology). Tjt is a vector of industry-level trade
variables which measure import competition from dierent country groups. Tit is a vector of rm-
level trade variables including variables that measure imports of intermediate or nished goods
from dierent country groups. t is time xed eect and i is rm xed eect.






it2 + t + i + "it (2)
Equation 2 is similar as Equation 1, but the dependant variable now becomes the skill structure
of rm employment. We use two measures for Sit. One is the share of production workers and the
other is the share of skilled workers (workers with higher than secondary school education). The
share of production workers can be calculated directly from the data, but share of skilled workers
is not directly available. We have the educational level of workers entering and quitting a rm in











where skill is the number of skilled workers, emp is the total employment, and skill net flow0:t
i
is the net inow (i.e., inow minus outow) of skilled workers between year 0 and year t for
rm i. The only thing on the righthand side of the equation that is unobservable in our data
is skilli0, which is the initial number of skilled workers in rm i. We used the initial number of
non-production workers as a proxy for skilli0.
Finally, we estimate a linear probability model for rm exit:






it2 + t + i + "it (3)
Where Deathit is a dummy indicating rm exit. We dened a rm as exiting in t if it disappears
from the data set for at least two consecutive years (t and t + 1).
For all the three equations above, we used exchange rate and ad valorem tari data to construct
IV's for industry-level and rm-level trade. The estimation results are shown in Tables 1 to 4.
10Table 1 shows the results for equation 1. Tables 2 and 3 show the results for equation 2, while
Table 4 contains the results for equation 3. In each Table, the rst two columns are the results of
`within' estimations. Column 3 and 4 instruments industry-level trade. In column 3 we use only
taris and exchanges rates as instruments while in column 4 we also included lagged trade as an
additional instruments. Column 5 and 6 instrument both industry-level and rm-level trade, with
column 6 including both tari/exchange rates and lagged industry-level trade as instruments. For
rm-level trade in columns 5 and 6 we only instrument imports from China and BJS countries
because instruments for imports from OECD and other countries are weak. Firm-level outsourcing
is always instrumented with both tari/exchange rates and its lag.
We use robust standard errors and statistics. At the bottom of each Table we report the
under-identication (Kleibergen-Paap LM), weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap Wald F), and
over-identication (Hansen J) statistics and p-vales. The number of rst stage regressions and
those among them with an F-test signicant the the 5% condence level are also indicated along
with the number of observations, rms, and the R2. Results indicates that our instruments for
industry-level trade are strong but there might be an issue of weak instrumentation for rm-level
trade in some specications. At the same time, the Hansen J statistic sometimes rejects the null
of over-identication suggesting that more than a single set of estimates one should evaluate the
broad picture emerging from all dierent estimations.
4.1 Employment Growth
Table 1 reports the relationship between rm employment growth and imports from dierent
country groups both at the industry- (import competition) and rm- (outsourcing of intermediate
and nished goods) level. The rst two columns report within estimates while the remaining four
columns report IV estimates. Both sets of regressions include year and rm xed eects to control
for aggregate trends in manufacturing employment growth and unobserved (time-invariant) rm
characteristics.
Within estimation results reveal that employment growth is negatively aected by import
competition from both China and BJS countries. Estimates for rm-level trade in column 2
indicate that outsourcing of nished (intermediate) goods from OECD (BJS and other countries)
positively aect rm growth. Other trade variables, at either industry- or rm- level, are not
signicant.
IV estimates in column 3 to 6 show that, at the industry level, only import competition
from China has a robust signicant negative eect on employment growth. Imports from BJS
11countries have signicant eect only when the lagged value of industry-level trade is included
as an additional instrument (column 4 and 6). Including lagged value as instruments may (as
suggested by the Hansen J statistics) exacerbate endogeneity problem and we consider column 3
and 5 as our preferred specications. The dierent impact of imports from China with respect
to BJS countries is consistent with Schott (2006) argument. Chinese exported products are more
sophisticated than those of BJS countries products and are thus more likely to compete with
Belgian products.
As for outsourcing, IV estimates in columns 5 and 6 show that outsourcing from OECD
and BJS countries is no longer signicant and only imports of intermediate goods from other
countries still have signicant positive eect on employment growth (although this latter is not
instrumented). The ambiguous eect of outsourcing on employment is in line with previous
industry-level ndings in the literature (Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei, 2005). Meanwhile, the liter-
ature suggests that outsourcing might have a clearer impact on the workforce composition. In
particular, it can increase the relative share of high-skilled jobs (Crino, 2008). This composition
eect is consistent with the results shown in the next Section.
4.2 Skill upgrading
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the relationship between import competition, outsourcing and rm's
relative demand for skilled workers. The rst two columns of each table report the within estimator
coecients while the remaining columns report IV results In all the regressions, we include year
and rm xed eects to control for aggregate trends in rm's demand for skilled workers and
unobserved (time-invariant) rm characteristics.
From the rst two columns in Tables 2 and 3, one can see that only import competition from
China has a positive and signicant eect on both measures of `skill upgrading' within the rm.
The coecient is in fact negative for the share of blue-collar workers and positive for the share
of skilled (i.e. having more than a secondary education) workers. As for rm-level imports by
country groups, estimates indicate that outsourcing generally induce within-rm skill upgrading
by reducing the share of production workers. Results for the share of skilled workers are by
contrast not signicant.
From the IV estimates, we get broadly similar results. For industry-level trade, we again
nd that only Chinese imports have a signicant eect on the workforce composition leading to
upgrading, both in terms of occupation and education. If we consider the point estimate from
12column 5 of Table 3, imports from China alone can explain around 30% of the total skill upgrading
in Belgian manufacturing industries during the period 1996-2007. For rm-level trade, we nd
evidence that outsourcing of intermediate goods from China decreases the share of production
workers. China is again dierent as outsourcing from BJS is never signicant. On the other hand
outsourcing of nished (intermediate) goods from OECD countries induces occupational upgrading
(downgrading), which suggest that China is also dierent from OECD countries. However, for this
last set of results caution is need as rm outsourcing with this country group is not instrumented.
Finally, outsourcing seems to have no eect on the share of skilled workers.
Together with the results in Section 4.1, we can deduce that import competition from China
reduces rm employment but leads rms to upgrade their workforce both in terms of occupation
types and education. Meanwhile, rm-level outsourcing to China will only change the occupational
composition of rm employment, but not the level of employment.
4.3 Firm exit
Table 4 shows the relationship between trade and rm exit. Within estimates in columns 1 and
2 show that import competition from China and BJS countries are not correlated with rm exit.
However, industry-level imports from OECD and other countries are positively and signicantly
correlated with rm exit. For rm-level trade, one can see that outsourcing is (whenever signi-
cant) negatively related to rm exit. Outsourcing of nished goods from both China and OECD
decreases the likelihood of exit. The same applies to outsourcing of intermediate goods from other
countries. The IV estimates somewhat destroy this picture with only a weakly signicant eect
of outsourcing from China and other countries on rm exit remaining alive.
When combined with the results from the previous two sections, the nding that import
competition from China has no eect on rm exit can be somewhat surprising. One possible
interpretation is that, even though import competition from China reduces rm employment, it
also pushes rms to upgrade their employment structure which may ultimately make them no
more likely to die. Overall, we see our results as consistent with the `moving up the quality
ladder' story by Schott (2008): manufacturing rms in developed countries can manage to survive
to the extent that they are able to specialize in the production of high quality goods.
5 Conclusion
13Imports from low-wage countries, and especially China, have been the fastest growing component
of Belgian trade during the last decade. This paper considers separately the role of imports
from China and other low-wage countries in Belgian manufacturing rms outcomes. Unlike most
previous research, we consider two dierent channels for the impact of imports: industry-level
import competition and rm-level outsourcing. We further innovate by providing IV results for
both import types.
We nd that trade with low-wage countries is important in explaining within rm employment
structure change in Belgian manufacturing, with imports from China playing a much more impor-
tant role than that from other low-wage countries. We nd that industry-level import competition
from China reduces rm employment but pushes rms to upgrade their workforce both in terms
of occupation and in terms of education. According to our estimations, import competition from
China alone can explain around 30% of the total skill upgrading in Belgian manufacturing during
the period 1996-2007. Meanwhile, outsourcing from China leads rms to upgrade their occupa-
tional structure without aecting employment growth. Interestingly, import competition from
both China and other low-wage countries does not aect rm exit while there is some evidence
that outsourcing from China actually increases a rm chances to survive. Overall, we see our
results as consistent with the 'moving up the quality ladder' story of Schott (2008).
Finally, we propose two directions for future research. First, we acknowledge that is extremely
diculty to instrument rm-level trade. Although we provide for the rst time IV results for rm
outsourcing, results are certainly not fully satisfactory in terms of instruments' strength. Second,
while we have explored the impact of trade with low-wage countries on several aspects of rm out-
comes, there are other margins of adjustment that rms can use when facing import competition,
such as product line switching, quality upgrading and technology upgrading. Evidence on these
margins is still limited, especially when we take into account the special role played by Chinese
trade.
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17Table 1: Employment growth
Dep. Var: Empl. growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE i FE if IV i nolag IV i lag IV if nolag IV if lag
wpw 0.0057 0.0116c 0.0057 0.0148b 0.0190a 0.0191a
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069)
kpw 0.0337a 0.0334a 0.0341a 0.0332a 0.0330a 0.0326a
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
vapw 0.0949a 0.1004a 0.0944a 0.1035a 0.1048a 0.1071a
(0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0054)
size -0.2953a -0.2941a -0.2983a -0.3139a -0.3120a -0.3105a
(0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0149)
age -0.0055a -0.0057a -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0035 -0.0047
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Tech 0.0235c 0.0246c 0.0228 0.0070 0.0055 0.0068
(0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0152) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0139)
BE imp share OECD 0.0043 0.0034 0.1958 -0.0195 0.2202c -0.0228
(0.0238) (0.0237) (0.1193) (0.0325) (0.1264) (0.0324)
BE imp share LW -0.4221b -0.4117b -0.0928 -0.5894a 0.0087 -0.5367b
(0.1704) (0.1711) (0.3741) (0.2075) (0.3902) (0.2089)
BE imp share China -0.5032a -0.5001a -0.9555a -0.5555a -1.0474a -0.5614a
(0.0869) (0.0873) (0.2523) (0.1023) (0.2640) (0.1025)
BE imp share other 0.0377 0.0345 0.1835 0.0008 -0.0263 -0.0630
(0.0753) (0.0766) (0.3779) (0.1171) (0.4182) (0.1209)
imp nished OECD 0.0000a -0.0190 -0.0132
(0.0000) (0.0186) (0.0186)
imp intermediate OECD 0.0065 0.0074 0.0066
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063)
imp nished BJS -0.0073 -0.1369 -0.0217
(0.0124) (0.1827) (0.0663)
imp intermediate BJS 0.4910c 0.8162 0.6589
(0.2513) (0.5119) (0.5267)
imp nished China -0.0471 -0.1979 -0.2624
(0.0294) (0.2182) (0.2109)
imp intermediate China 0.0832 -0.1248 -0.1630
(0.2084) (0.3021) (0.2988)
imp nished Other 0.0626 0.2216 0.3156
(0.0601) (0.2694) (0.2733)
imp intermediate Other 0.0039a 0.0038a 0.0038a
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Underidentication 307.6 3684.7 19.9 15.1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0968) (0.5852)
Weak identication 47.4 668.2 1.0 0.5
Hansen J 54.1 69.6 59.0 76.9
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N. rst-stage reg. 4 4 8 8
N. rst-stage p<0.05 4 4 7 7
Observations 118769 117941 116519 110651 110997 109702
R-squared 0.1976 0.2009 0.1964 0.2029 0.1979 0.2010
Number of rms 17961 17832 15929 15178 15233 15052
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
18Table 2: Share of production workers
Dep. Var: Share P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE i FE if IV i nolag IV i lag IV if nolag IV if lag
wpw 0.0340a 0.0394a 0.0340a 0.0412a 0.0431a 0.0433a
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026)
kpw 0.0019b 0.0015 0.0019a 0.0017b 0.0015b 0.0016b
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
vapw 0.0071a 0.0099a 0.0070a 0.0113a 0.0126a 0.0126a
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
size -0.0476a -0.0460a -0.0479a -0.0439a -0.0435a -0.0434a
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038)
age -0.0046a -0.0047a -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Tech -0.0094 -0.0099c -0.0093a -0.0099a -0.0107a -0.0105a
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035)
BE imp share OECD -0.0074 -0.0069 -0.0368 0.0035 -0.0709 0.0038
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0497) (0.0126) (0.0529) (0.0126)
BE imp share LW -0.1011 -0.0990 0.3393a -0.0172 0.2750b -0.0286
(0.0735) (0.0734) (0.1269) (0.0732) (0.1386) (0.0763)
BE imp share China -0.1225a -0.1228a -0.3765a -0.1888a -0.3244a -0.1967a
(0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0943) (0.0382) (0.1018) (0.0390)
BE imp share other 0.0813b 0.0795b 0.1451 0.0210 0.2378 0.0243
(0.0322) (0.0325) (0.1334) (0.0405) (0.1619) (0.0445)
imp nished OECD -0.0423a -0.0437a -0.0454a
(0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0107)
imp intermediate OECD 0.0082a 0.0088a 0.0086a
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0021)
imp nished BJS -0.0027 0.0606 0.0462
(0.0034) (0.0757) (0.0585)
imp intermediate BJS -0.1585 -0.1208 -0.0982
(0.1049) (0.1841) (0.1908)
imp nished China -0.0060 0.3443 0.1854
(0.0140) (0.3302) (0.2578)
imp intermediate China -0.1212c -0.2807a -0.2938a
(0.0666) (0.1072) (0.1074)
imp nished Other -0.0040 -0.3815 -0.2111
(0.0314) (0.3213) (0.2675)
imp intermediate Other -0.0716b -0.0606b -0.0711a
(0.0334) (0.0241) (0.0237)
Underidentication 240.6 3680.3 9.5 12.4
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7355) (0.7755)
Weak identication 41.0 707.3 0.6 0.6
Hansen J 2.1 28.2 17.8 40.4
(0.7265) (0.0004) (0.1216) (0.0007)
N. rst-stage reg. 4 4 8 8
N. rst-stage p<0.05 4 4 6 6
Observations 121453 120789 119476 113244 113893 112435
R-squared 0.0519 0.0553 0.0503 0.0546 0.0447 0.0535
Number of rms 17342 17268 15573 14734 14880 14638
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
19Table 3: Share of skilled workers
Dep. Var: Share S (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE i FE if IV i nolag IV i lag IV  nolag IV  lag
kpw 0.0458c 0.0446c 0.0453c 0.0465c 0.0430c 0.0446c
(0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0247) (0.0251) (0.0246) (0.0251)
vapw -0.0280 -0.0273 -0.0272 -0.0294 -0.0239 -0.0278
(0.0377) (0.0383) (0.0304) (0.0318) (0.0311) (0.0325)
size 0.2896a 0.2900a 0.2931a 0.2951a 0.2975a 0.2972a
(0.0714) (0.0728) (0.0547) (0.0558) (0.0560) (0.0569)
age -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0124 -0.0107
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0234) (0.0242) (0.0234) (0.0240)
Tech 0.0154 0.0152 0.0164 0.0161 0.0175 0.0163
(0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0234) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0243)
BE imp share OECD 0.0463 0.0428 -0.1095 0.0527 -0.3413c 0.0449
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.2107) (0.0500) (0.1999) (0.0500)
BE imp share LW -0.0842 -0.0850 -0.7461 -0.4409 -0.2927 -0.3587
(0.3306) (0.3346) (0.4616) (0.3134) (0.5098) (0.3116)
BE imp share China 0.9750b 0.9788b 1.8790a 1.5223a 1.9240a 1.5282a
(0.3985) (0.3948) (0.4848) (0.3319) (0.5170) (0.3354)
BE imp share other -0.0930 -0.0753 0.0968 -0.1303 -0.4305 -0.1912
(0.1366) (0.1460) (0.4778) (0.1797) (0.5533) (0.2056)
imp nished OECD 0.0318 0.0483 0.0346
(0.0328) (0.0343) (0.0312)
imp intermediate OECD -0.0053 -0.0093 -0.0057
(0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0058)
imp nished BJS 0.0102 0.0774 -0.0246
(0.0110) (0.1165) (0.0648)
imp intermediate BJS 0.1109 1.5795c 1.4662
(0.5733) (0.9162) (0.9294)
imp nished China 0.0634 -0.1162 0.0096
(0.0517) (0.3697) (0.3558)
imp intermediate China 0.1276 -0.5336 -0.4552
(0.2885) (0.5309) (0.5060)
imp nished Other -0.1227 0.2352 -0.0193
(0.1259) (0.7278) (0.7018)
imp intermediate Other 0.0686 0.0100 -0.0235
(0.0892) (0.2750) (0.2816)
Underidentication 154.5 704.0 32.9 22.7
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0,0018) (0,1581)
Weak identication 24.3 114.7 1.6 1.2
Hansen J 18.2 21.5 28.8 36.5
(0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0024)
N. rst-stage reg. 4 4 8 8
N. rst-stage p<0.05 4 4 7 6
Observations 26913 26842 18843 18408 18811 18377
R-squared 0.2465 0.2520 0.2446 0.2471 0.2450 0.2523
Number of rms 10377 10323 2339 2276 2338 2275
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
20Table 4: Firm exit
Dep. Var: Firm exit 2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE i FE if IV i nolag IV i lag IV if nolag IV if lag
wpw 0.0084a 0.0048b 0.0086a 0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0007
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
kpw -0.0044a -0.0039a -0.0044a -0.0033a -0.0032a -0.0031a
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009)
vapw -0.0234a -0.0264a -0.0236a -0.0312a -0.0327a -0.0332a
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
size -0.0113b -0.0126b -0.0120a -0.0176a -0.0185a -0.0186a
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
age 0.0064a 0.0066a 0.0023 0.0018 0.0015 0.0018
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Tech 0.0063 0.0069 0.0056 0.0044 0.0049 0.0049
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042)
BE imp share OECD 0.0284a 0.0272a 0.0850 0.0258 0.0516 0.0270
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0609) (0.0174) (0.0586) (0.0175)
BE imp share LW 0.0370 0.0313 0.4489b 0.1548 0.3505 0.1691
(0.0787) (0.0785) (0.2242) (0.1068) (0.2224) (0.1082)
BE imp share China 0.0304 0.0314 -0.1539 -0.0678 -0.0977 -0.0741
(0.0412) (0.0413) (0.1406) (0.0504) (0.1353) (0.0510)
BE imp share other 0.0736b 0.0744b -0.6016a 0.0025 -0.4275b 0.0050
(0.0352) (0.0356) (0.2139) (0.0594) (0.2129) (0.0603)
imp nished OECD -0.0000a 0.0061 0.0017
(0.0000) (0.0100) (0.0084)
imp intermediate OECD -0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0017)
imp nished BJS -0.0008 0.0143 -0.0500
(0.0012) (0.0259) (0.0781)
imp intermediate BJS 0.0070 -0.0814 -0.0820
(0.0793) (0.1508) (0.1550)
imp nished China -0.1486a -0.1407b -0.0993
(0.0523) (0.0693) (0.0624)
imp intermediate China -0.0337 0.2662 0.2761
(0.0622) (0.1715) (0.1682)
imp nished Other -0.0502 -0.0368 -0.0476
(0.0333) (0.0323) (0.0332)
imp intermediate Other -0.0004a -0.0004b -0.0004b
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Underidentication 353.2 3103.9 24.8 18.2
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0248) (0.3761)
Weak identication 51.6 646.3 1.4 0.7
Hansen J 6.7 24.6 26.1 37.2
(0.1506) (0.0018) (0.0104) (0.0020)
N. rst-stage reg. 4 4 8 8
N. rst-stage p<0.05 4 4 7 8
Observations 118267 117377 116227 109735 109938 108708
R-squared 0.0216 0.0227 0.0173 0.0251 0.0231 0.0254
Number of rms 18691 18572 16811 15929 15941 15779
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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